An Atomicity-Generating Layer for Anonymous Currencies by Camp, L. Jean
1An Atomicity-Generating Layer fo  Anonymous Currencies
L.  Jean Camp, Ph.D.
L-213
Harvard University
Cambridge MA 02138
Abstract*
Atomicity is a necessary element for reliable transactions (Financial Service Technology
Consortium, 1995; Camp, Sirbu and Tygar, 1995; Tygar, 1996).  Anonymity is also an
issue of great importance not only to designers of commerce systems, (Chaum, 1982;
Chaum, 1989; Chaum, Fiat & Naor, 1988; Medvinski, 1993), but also to those concerned
with the societal effects of information technologies (Branscomb 1994.  Compaine 1985,
National Research Council 1996, Neumann 1993, Poole 1983).  Yet there has been a trade-
off between these two elements in commerce system design.  Reliable systems, which
provide highly atomic transactions, offer limited anonymity (Visa, 1995; Sirbu and Tygar,
1995; Mastercard, 1995, Low, Maxemchuk and Paul, 1993) .  Anonymous systems
(Chaum, 1985; Chaum 1989; Medvinski, 1993) do not offer reliable transactions as shown
in Yee, 1994; Camp, 1999; and Tygar, 1996.  This work illustrates that any electronic token
currency can be made reliable with the addition of this atomicity-generating layer.
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2Introduction
Electronic commerce includes sending electronic payments over a public network to obtain
electronic goods or promises of the delivery of physical goods.  Can customers protect their
privacy and their money in such a transaction?  Privacy means that the subject of
information controls that information.  Anonymity means that information has no subject --
that is, identity is not linked to the information.  To protect privacy and money, Internet
transactions must be atomic and anonymous.  Atomicity means that a transaction cannot be
broken into its parts (payment , delivery and receipt).  An atomic transaction succeeds
completely or fails completely.
There are two kinds of money: notational and token.  With notational money funds exist as
entries in a ledger, such as in a banking record.  In the case of notational money the study of
database transactions can be directly applied to ensure consistency.  Notational money is
most common today in point of sale exchanges using ATM cards.  Electronic commerce
proposals based on checks and credit cards are notational money.  However, token moneys
are a difficult problem.  Token moneys are analogous to cash -- the value is bound to the
instrument.  Thus sending token moneys over networks can result in the same problems as
sending cash through the mail.  That is, the recipient may deny its receipt or the cash may be
lost, stolen or destroyed in transit.  This problem has also been referred to as the “dine and
dash” problem (Simon, 1996).
In electronic commerce, the payment message must travel over an insecure network from the
customer to the merchant.  Without verifiable acknowledgment in the protocol, the customer
will not know that the merchant received the payment message.  Under the standard
transmission control protocol (TCP), a payment may be duplicated when the
communications protocol believes the packet containing the payment message was lost on
the network.  Moreover, a payment message may be destroyed by network failure.  If a
payment message is lost, delayed, or destroyed, confusion rather than consistency may
result.
To better understand how anonymity and atomicity conflict consider the use of Digicash1
token (Yee, 1994).  If a transfer of Digicash tokens from the customer to the merchant is
interrupted, then it is possible that both or neither party may believe it has legitimate access
to the token.  The customer may attempt to resolve this state by canceling the token (by
cashing it in), but if the merchant also does this, the result is a race condition.  Another
possible failure creates an opportunity for theft.  The bank cannot trace tokens.  Thus if a
merchant claims that he was not paid by a particular customer, and the customer otherwise;
there is no technique for dispute resolution.  There is no link between transaction and token.
The customer has been defrauded.  In short, what is needed, and what is presented here, is a
general technique for anonymous rollback.  This problem has been solved in a limited case
(Camp, Harkavy, Tygar and Yee, 1996) here I present an extension for the general case.
The atomicity-generating layer presented here provides the highest level of atomicity, and
removes the risk of loss or stolen tokens.  Previous work has defined degrees of atomicity
(Camp, Sirbu and Tygar, 1995; Tygar 1996).  In money atomic transactions, money is
conserved.  In transactions with goods atomicity, here is money atomicity and the delivery
of information goods is linked to payment.  The merchant is paid if and only if some goods
                                                
1 I refer to the family of Chaum’s blinded tokens with no embedded identity information as “Digicash
tokens” for reasons of brevity.
3are delivered.  Certified delivery subsumes money atomicity, goods atomicity, and in
addition requires that the merchant is paid if and only if the pr mised goods are delivered.
In certified delivery the content of the goods can be proven to a third party.  Note that goods
atomicity and certified delivery are only applicable for information goods.
Currently published token currencies do not provide money atomicity.  Simple anonymous
rollback is not feasible.  Without proper record-keeping every anonymous individual could
claim to have sent money to another.  Token currencies illustrate the possible trade-off
between atomicity and anonymity suggested in the discussion of rollback (for examples see
Rivest and Shamir, 1996; Yee, 1994; Camp, 1999; and Tygar, 1996).
Digicash (Chaum, 1985) is the canonical anonymous token currency.  Yet Digicash has no
atomicity as described above.  In the later version of Digicash, (Chaum, Fiat & Naor, 1988),
Chaum attempted to provide money atomicity, through encoding identity into each token to
be spent.  Encoding identity allows double-senders to be identified, thereby resolving the
conflict between anonymity and accountability in the case of double spending.  The addition
of integrity provides sufficient information for dispute resolution in issues of payment, but
not enough information to resolve disputes over goods delivery.  This alteration again
illustrates the perceived trade-off between atomicity and anonymity.
MicroMint (Rivest and Shamir, 1996), which uses hashing rather than public key operations
to affordably generate large quantities of electronic cash, offers no money atomicity in its
most simple form.  In order to provide money atomicity there is an extended version of
MicroMint where customer identity is included in every token.  Thus the extension of
MicroMint to provide money atomicity depends on the requirement that every consumer
identify herself to the merchant to verify her right to spend a token.  This is another
illustration of the conflict between atomicity and anonymity: to make rollback possible the
customer provides identity information.
An alternative approach to ensuring atomicity without limiting anonymity requires that every
user have tamper proof, trusted hardware usually in the form of an active smart card
(Brands, 1993; Brickell, Gemmell, and Kravitz, 1995; Burk & Pfitzmann, 1989, Boly et al.
1994).  This requires that for commerce every user have a smart card or tamper-resistant
hardware.  It would also require that every commerce access location (such as consumers’
home machines) have a smart card reader.  The layer described here has four fundamental
differences with the tamper-proof trusted party approach.
First, there is a fundamental philosophical difference between the distributed trust approach
in this layer and the smart card or wallet approach.  The trusted party for the layer is trusted
only with the minimal information necessary to resolve disputes.  There is no external
observer who is completely trusted, and who could commit theft if it alone were subverted.
The trust is not place completely in the customer’s wallet.  The approach in trusted
hardware systems is essentially the trusted computing base approach where the tamper
proof smart card is the completely trusted base.  Trust and security are then built in an
axiomatic manner on that base.  The approach here is fundamentally a survivability
approach.  Assume that any single party can be dishonest or subversive.  Assure that theft
can not happen without subversion of multiple parties.  This layer distributes trust for
survivability rather than concentrating it in a trusted base.
Second, this layer differs from the tamper-proof hardware-based designs in implementation
requirements.  This layer does not require that every consumer or every merchant own
completely trustworthy hardware.  This system could be implemented on the Internet today
4without the addition of the card and card-reading infrastructure.  This hardware is required
by trusted parties implemented in specialized, consumer-specific hardware assumed in the
trusted computing base approach.
Third, this system could be added to many token currencies.  The creation of the token or
script may require multiple exchanges.  Spending the money may require multiple
exchanges; however the steps shown here can be wrapped before and after the money is
exchanged.  The token need not be a single token and the steps for obtaining a token need
not be as described below.  If there is a breakpoint, after which time the merchant has the
token, the messages which lead to this point can be treated as a token.  Furthermore,
messages 1-4 in Figure 1 could consist of any number of messages as long as there is some
digital information at the end of the exchange which represents and is bound to monetary
value.  Given that there are over one hundred proposed electronic commerce mechanisms
(many of which are, of course, notational; see Mackie-Mason, 1998) the value of a general
solution to the problem of anonymous token atomicity is clear.
Consider the solution of atomic exchanges without tamper-proof hardware, meaning that it
is possible for any single player to be corrupt.  An analysis of protocols for Internet
commerce based on notational currency illustrates reliability is often simplified by creating a
single ledger (Mackie-Mason, 1996).  This single ledger in these cases is a networked entity
controlled by the creator of currency who also serves to moderate disputes.  The creation of
a single ledger means that there is a concentration of information -- thus implying a threat to
privacy and survivability.
Counter-intuitively, anonymity is provided through the creation of a publicly readable
transaction log.  The transaction log provides forced serialization.  The transaction log
receives and records messages and then publicized the recorded messages.  The log also
acts as a time-keeper, aborting transactions that expire
I first describe the necessary assumptions and parties to the protocol.  In the following
section I describe the protocol itself.  I then show that the use of this layer provides
anonymity.  I discuss the trust assumptions, and possible results of worst-case failures.
1.  Assumptions
I assume all parties can perform basic cryptographic operations.  All parties have well-
known or verifiable public keys.  Other assumptions are that the private elements of public
keys are not disclosed; that tokens are verifiable; and that the bank can distinguish those
tokens to be used with certified delivery.  Distinguishing tokens to be used with certified
delivery enables the bank to refuse their deposit without appropriate transactional records.
Communication channels are assumed to be secure.
As is common in electronic commerce protocols (Sirbu, 1995; Mastercard, 1996;
Mastercard, 1995; Visa, 1995) message signatures are computed on hash values of the
plaintext and then appended to the plaintext to form a signed message.
There are four parties to each transaction: a bank, a customer, a merchant and a transaction
log.  In the following discussions the customer is assumed female; the merchant male; and
the bank and log neuter.  This allows me to use she, he and it without worrying that the
reader may confuse the noun referenced by the pronoun.
5The transaction log and bank are separated for clarity of exposition.  There is no reason that
the entities referred to here as transaction log and bank are not merely separate machines in
the same facility or possibly separate severs on the same machine, analogous to the ledgers
and vault of a depository institution.  It is possible that separation between the log and the
bank increases survivability.
Each transaction has an expiration time.  This implies that the banks and the logs have
synchronized clocks.  The customers and merchants are then responsible for synchronizing
with their log or bank of choice.  Although this is a nontrivial problem, there are established
approaches to the problem of synchronizing distributed secure transactions (Smith, 1992).
2.  A Transaction: Preparation & Purchase
Figure 1, below, illustrates the preparation steps required in an anonymous atomic purchase.
In the first step the customer obtains a token from her bank.  In order to assure anonymity,
the bank must be unable to match the token received in step three with the token sent in step
two.  There are multiple techniques for providing anonymous tokens, and many such
techniques would be useful here.  Notice I make no claims about introducing a new
technique for generating anonymous tokens -- only removing the previously necessary
trade-off between the use of anonymous currencies and atomicity.  The flexibility of this
atomicity-generating layer allows steps one and two to be as many steps as necessary -- as
long as an anonymous token is the result.  The only specification necessary is that the
resulting token be anonymous and, as noted above, identifiable by the bank as for use only
with certified delivery.
Customer Bank
1.Customer requests blinded token
2. Bank sends blinded token
3. Customer sends public key and h(t)
4. Bank sends signed receipt
    
Figure 1: Preparation for an Anonymous Atomic Transaction
I assume the customer generates a public/private key pair to be used uniquely for the
purpose of assuring certified delivery for this particular transaction.  Call this pair q and Q
to distinguish them from the pair c and C normally used by the customer and linked to her
identity.  The key pair (q, Q) is linked to the ownership of the token, not to the identity of
the customer.  Since the key pair is linked only to the token, then the key pair is as
anonymous or pseudonymous as the token to which it is linked.
Thus the steps are:
3: C -> B h(anonymous token),Q
4: B -> C (h(anonymous token),Q)b
Key pairs q and Q can be generated off-line in advance of purchases.  Notice that the key
needs only to be strong enough to make obtaining the token cost prohibitive.
6In the fourth step the bank returns a signed receipt for the token and the public key.  This
receipt enables the customer to demand that the subject token not be accepted for deposit
unless accompanied by a receipt signed by the token specific key, q, indicating customer
commitment to the transaction.  The receipt is, in effect, a public key certificate, issued by
the bank, binding the public key Q to the rightful holder of the token t.
The customer may now begin the transaction, as shown below in Figure 2.  The steps are
numbered consecutively, with the assumption that they follow the preparation steps above.
Each step also has an associated label to simplify the following discussion of atomicity.
The customer is assumed to have the merchant's certificate and key; and the merchant is
assumed to have the certificate that binds the public key Q to the rightful holder of the
token.  As is common in electronic commerce protocols, the exchange of certificates is not
shown.
P1: M -> C (contract, Ek(goods), TID, L, Q)m
P2: C -> B (t, expiration, M, L, price, TID, Q)q
P3: B -> M (expiration, M, L, price, TID)b
P4: M -> L (expiration, k, TID)m
P5: L ((expiration, k, TID)m)l
P6: M -> C (k)
Table 1 provides the definitions of the terms used above.
Field Description
contract The contract includes a human-readable description
of the goods being ordered, the price, and the hash
of the encrypted goods
TID Transaction identifier.  Globally unique identifier.
L The log chosen as the point of serialization for this
transaction.
t The token.
expiration A time after which the transaction, if not completed,
is to be aborted.
M The merchant’s identity.  Includes account number
and merchant bank identifiers as necessary.
k A secret key used only to encrypt the goods.
Table 1: Fields in the Anonymous Certified Delivery Protocol
The messages in a transaction using anonymous certified delivery are shown in Figure 2.
To initiate the transaction the customer must contact the merchant.  Such contact may allow
the customer's identity to be inferred.  However, I assume here that this contact allows the
customer to remain anonymous, implying that the customer is using an anonymizer or
anonymous remailer.
7During purchase step one, limits on the purchase or special discounts can be negotiated, if
the customer wants to include such an offer.  For example, the repeated use of a token-
specific key would create a pseudonym that would allow for subscriptions or repeat visit
discounts.  This would allow merchants to link sequential transactions; however, it would
not allow merchants to link these purchases to a unique individual.
Before purchase step two, three elements of the transaction must be agreed upon:
description of the item, price, and transaction identifier (TID).  The transaction identifier
must be globally unique.  Some combination of a serial number and the merchant’s identity
can provide a unique TID.
Purchase step two is the provision of the contract.  In preparation for purchase step two the
merchant generates a secret key, k, and encrypts the requested merchandise with this key.
Notice that k is a secret key used for symmetric encryption rather than the private part of a
private/public key pair.  The merchant then sends the encrypted goods.  Because the
merchant encrypts the information, there has been no exchange of valuables.
Note that without a secure channel any observer could steal the encrypted merchandise if the
transaction is successful -- implying that this channel must be secured using the readily
available public keys.  The merchant may choose a common method, such as SSL, or more
expensive proprietary options.  The mechanism for establishing the secure channel does not
affect the overall protocol -- as long as this technique does not expose customer identity
information.  The establishment of a secure channel is a source of cost, thus merchants
should be able to choose their encryption methods based on their sensitivity to theft.  After
the end of this step the token has not been exposed, nor has the customer received a useful
item.
Customer
Bank Log
Merchant
P1.  Requests item
P2. Sends signed contract & encrypted goods
P3.  Sends merchant 
account, timeout, log 
identity, token, TID
 
P4. Notifies merchant that 
customer is commited 
P5. Claims goods 
by sending signed 
key, TID, price
P7. Key 
Key query
P6
    
Figure 2: An Atomic Anonymous Transaction
In purchase step three the customer commits to the transaction by exposing the token.  The
customer sends the merchant’s identifier, expiration, the amount of the transaction, the
8transaction identifier, the log chosen for this transaction, and the token.  The merchant’s
identifier may be any unique identifier.  All this is signed with the token-specific key, q.
This signature, together with the receipt (“certificate”) from the bank proves that the
customer is authorized to spend the token.
In purchase step four the bank notifies the merchant that the customer has committed.  If the
material signed by the bank is not what is claimed by the customer, the merchant can refuse
to commit.
In purchase step five the merchant commits to the transaction by providing the key to the
log.  If the information is not correct, the customer may claim a refund.  Thus it is not in the
interest of the merchant to provide false information.
In purchase step six the log generates the global commitment by making the key publicly
available.  The customer may demand this receipt in order to obtain the key, if it is not
promptly delivered.
In purchase step seven, the merchant completes the transaction by sending the key to the
customer.  Requiring that the merchant send the key to the customer reduces the load on the
log, since most transactions will be without conflict or failure.
Note that if the transaction is aborted rather than completed the log would generate the
following entry and send it to the bank:
P7: L -> B (M, TID, failed)l
This global abort message would replace the global commit message which entailed the
publication of the key, k.
If the merchant commits with the log but fails to provide the key, the customer can query the
log for the key.  The query, shown as a dotted line in Figure 2, consists of two messages:
Q1: C -> L (TID)
Q2: L -> C (TID, k)l
This protocol provides goods atomicity and certified delivery.  Consider the possible
failures at each step.  If purchase steps one or two, request and contract respectively, fail,
then there is no transaction.  If purchase steps three through six fail, then the merchant is
never paid and the customer has only encrypted goods, which are of no use.  If purchase
steps three or four, customer commitment and notification respectively, fail then the
merchant is never paid and the customer never obtains useful goods.  If the merchant
replaces the valid key with a bogus key or changes the expiration, the customer would have
the necessary proof to obtain a refund or prevent the merchant from claiming payment
(depending upon the time when the merchant attempted the replacement).  If purchase step
five, merchant commitment, fails, then the key is never delivered, the goods remain
encrypted, and the merchant's deposit is never completed.  The same is true if purchase step
six fails; there is no key delivery and no deposit.
9Purchase step seven is the global commitment.  When purchase step seven is completed
both key delivery and deposit are assured.  Deposit is assured because the bank will credit
the merchant in the absence of an abort message.  Key delivery is assured because the
customer can query the log directly and obtain the key if the merchant fails to deliver it
directly.  This assures goods atomicity.
Note that there is no need to encrypt purchase message seven: it is simply the key.  The key
need not be signed for there is already a verifiable copy of the key in the transaction log.
The protocol provides certified delivery since the description of merchandise and the item
delivered can be verified from purchase step two.  The contract includes a description of the
item requested and a checksum of the item delivered, and is accompanied in purchase step
two by a unique transaction identifier.  All three fields are digitally signed by the merchant.
If upon decryption the item delivered does not match the description, then the customer can
obtain a refund.
The merchant could send a bogus key and claim the deposit.  In this case the holder of the
token-specific public key could present the actual merchandise as delivered to the
merchant’s or customer’s bank, and show that the decrypted merchandise does not match
the description.  The bank would refund the customer's money by generating a token of
equal value and transmitting it to the customer using the anonymous public key for secure
delivery2.  The value of this token would be debited from the merchant’s account.
There is one trust assumption in this protocol: the merchant must trust the log to record
received messages.  If the log fails to record the merchant’s commitment, but instead passes
the key to the consumer, then the consumer will gain access to the goods while the merchant
will not be able to demand payment.  This trust requirement is the reason that the merchant
selects the log in purchase step two.
The existence of a requirement for trust between the merchant and the transaction log is one
argument for combining the log with the bank, since banks already play the role of trusted
financial intermediary.  In this case, purchase steps two, three and four (the contract,
customer's commitment and notification, respectively) would not include the log selected,
since the selection of the bank would imply a transaction log.  Thus, while the merchant
would not select the log, the merchant would instead extend trust to the customer's bank.
Conversely, the requirement for trust is also an argument for separating the log and the
bank.  Banks could then work as filters with a function analogous to the current role of
acquiring banks in the credit card system, and refuse to work with logs which were the
subject of many complaints or suspected of fraud.
3 Security
There are four public key sets in this system: the transaction log’s, the token-specific, the
bank’s and the merchant’s.
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identity information during the transmission, for example, though knowledge of IP address.
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The use of variable public keys limits the amount a customer can lose if a private key is lost.
If a key is lost, both the customer and the thief could ‘prove’ ownership of a token.  Thus
refunds are not possible in the case of lost keys.  Customer loss could be limited by
requiring that keys be changed at a given monetary increment, or limiting the denomination
of a single token if no keys are reused.
If an attacker obtains the token-specific private key then the attacker has obtained deposit
authorization.  However, without the token as well, the attacker cannot complete a
transaction.
If an attacker obtains a merchant’s key then the attacker can cause the merchant much
difficulty in terms of resolving conflicts but cannot force refunds or obtain free
merchandise.  The attacker can construct a purchase order with a product description, price
and faked record of a delivery.  (This would require only that the attacker has a token and
the corresponding keys.  Presumably these are easy to obtain legitimately.) Then the
attacker can create a false key, endorse the faked purchase order and send it as a commit.  It
would appear that the merchant unsuccessfully attempted to defraud the customer.  The
attacker can then request that the merchant prove the merchandise.  The merchant could then
detect the attack, decline the transaction, and refuse the transaction amount.  There would be
no deposit in the merchant’s account, so the merchant would owe neither money nor the
key.
If an attacker could obtain the keys of the transaction log, the attacker could masquerade as
the log.  In that case the attacker could steal merchandise as previously described.
4.  Privacy
The information available to each party in an anonymous certified delivery transaction is
shown below in Table 2.
Note that information transmitted through communications channels, such as IP address or
email from the browser, is not included.  Note that to assure anonymity the customer must
use an anonymizer or remailer.
Information
Party
Merchant Customer Date Amount Item
Merchant Full None Full Full Full
Customer Full Full Full Full Full
Transaction
Log
Full None Full None None
Bank Full None Full Full None
Electronic
Observer
Full None Full None None
Table 2: Information Available with Anonymous Certified Delivery
Note that a public key is not needed for each new token.  In that case the customer's public
key resembles a pseudonym.  The probability of linking any pseudonym, in this case the
public key, to real identity increases as the pseudonym is used in many locations, used
frequently or over a long time period.  The use of a merchant-specific pseudonym would
11
provide credentials whereby a repeat customer could obtain the appropriate discounts or a
subscriber could obtain periodicals.
5.  Conclusions
Issues of reliability and consumer protection are addressed in this protocol.  Before the
publication of this work there was no protocol for generalizable anonymous rollback.  The
anonymous certified delivery layer fulfills the most stringent technical requirements for
atomicity.  Previously published anonymous currencies could not provide the highest level
of atomicity without the addition of this layer or the use of specialized, trusted hardware.
Implementation issues which must be considered with this protocol are the storage of
purchase-specific keys, and managing time-outs over long distances with uncertain
transmission times.  Simple issues, such as time zone differences, can be solved by using a
standard time zone.  However , tightly coordinated times may be critical for some
information, such as stock information.  Such products would require a well-recorded
standard (e.g.  Eastern Standard Time).  Time sensitivity could be negotiated as part of the
transaction and recorded in the product description.
Since tokens can be bundled, with a single key for many tokens, long-term deliveries or
streaming deliveries can be accomplished whereby the keys are released at pre-set intervals.
The value and timing of each partial delivery would necessarily be part of the negotiation
and product description.
A significant issue in this layer is the addition of a large database and the requirement that it
store keys and records for significant time periods.  This memory storage is the largest
drawback to this protocol.  However, multiple logs could compete so that there is not a
single point of storage.  The selection of a log would again be subject to negotiation .
Notice that this protocol is optimized for on-line delivery.  In the case of physical goods, the
receipt and confirmation of order can be secured in this method but the delivery of the
physical good cannot be verified.
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